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COMPLETE T 1ST OF AT J, PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Marian R. Flake is Decedent's surviving spouse. Four of the Decedent's five 
children have contested her claims. Joel Flake, Trustee and three of his siblings: 
Lynette, Connie and Mark have made either personal appearances (pro se) or through 
various counsel. But the positions of the four contesting children have generally been 
represented through Joel Flake, acting in his capacity as Trustee. Vickie, the oldest 
child has refused to join her siblings in this litigation. 
The names and addresses of the four contesting children are: 
Joel Almon Flake Lynette Flake Watts 
1913 West 500 North 984 North 500 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 Centerville, Utah 84014 
Connie Flake Jackson Mark Widdison Flake 
193 West 1250 North 943 West 150 South 
Centerville, Utah 84014 Kaysville, Utah 84037 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THF APPFTI ATE COURT 
Under Order dated July 5, 2001 Jurisdiction was transferred to the Supreme Court 
because appeal is taken from an order, judgment or decree of a district court in a civil 
case, not involving domestic relations, and is not within the original appellate 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
and § 78-2a-3 (j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
Issue: 
The trial court construed § 75-3-912, of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, holding 
that the requirements of that portion of the Code are not applicable to nonprobate 
transfers under §§ 75-7-101 through 75-7-411, namely decedent's transfers to 
successors under court supervision in "Trust Administration." 
Standard for Review: 
Interpretation of a legislative enactment is a conclusion of law. Savage 
Industries v. State, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). Conclusions of law are given no particular 
deference on appeal but are reviewed for correctness. See also: Carrier v. Pro-Tech, 
944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997). 
Citation to Record Showing Preservation of Issue Presented for Review: 
This issue was the sole question before the trial court during "Phase I" of the 
trial. By verbal pretrial order in chambers, the trial court directed that there be five 
phases, indicating that should the trial court rule against Appellant at any one of the 
phases then Appellant would have no further claim. In Phase I, the trial court held that 
4 
§ 75-3-912 of the Utah Probate Code was not applicable to transfers made under §§ 75-
7-101 through 75-7-411 of the Utah Probate Code. 
On October 11, 2000, Appellant filed a Rule 59 Motion1 and her Memorandum in 
Support of Rule 59 Motion,2 objecting to the trial court findings and ruling under the 
grounds that such a ruling would constitute "reversible error."3 
STATUTES — INTERPRETATION OF WHICH IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code more specifically: 
§ 75-1-102. Purpose — Rule of construction. 
1. This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies. 
2. The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: 
a. To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of 
decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and 
incapacitated persons; 
b. To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in 
distribution of his property; 
c. To promote a speedy and efficient system of administering the 
estate of the decedent and making distribution to his 
successors; 
d. To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts: and 
e. To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
§ 75-3-912. Private agreements among successors to decedent binding 
upon personal representative. 
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing authorities, competent 
successors may agree among themselves to alter the interests, shares, or 
amount to which they are entitled under the will of the decedent, or under 
the laws of intestacy, in any way that they provide in a written contract 
executed by all who are affected by its provisions. The personal 
representative shall abide by the terms of the agreement, subject to his 
obligation to administer the estate for the benefit of creditors, to pay all 
1
 Record 801-801 
2
 Record 803-814 
3
 Record 813, first line of "Conclusion;" See also Transcript, 9/29/2000 discussion in 
regard to ruling on Phase I, commencing at page 330. 
3 
taxes and costs of administration, and to carry out the responsibilities of 
his office for the benefit of any successors of the decedent who are not 
parties. Personal representatives of decedents' estates are not required to 
see to the performance of trusts if the trustee thereof is another person 
who is willing to accept the trust. Accordingly, trustees of a testamentary 
trust are successors for the purposes of this section. Nothing contained 
in this section relieves trustees of any duties owned to beneficiaries of 
trusts. 
75-7-201. Court — Exclusive jurisdiction of trusts. 
(1) The Court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by 
interested parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts. Proceedings 
which may be maintained under this section are those concerning the 
administration and distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights, and 
the determination of other matters involving trustees and beneficiaries 
of trusts. These include, but are not limited to, proceedings to: 
a. Appoint or remove a trustee. 
b. Review trustees' fees and review and settle interim or final 
accounts. 
c. Ascertain beneficiaries, determine any question arising in the 
administration or distribution of any trust, including questions of 
construction of trust instruments, instruct trustees and determine 
the existence or nonexistence of any immunity, power, privilege, 
duty, or right. 
* * * 
(2) A proceeding under this section does not result in continuing 
supervision by the court over the administration of the trust. The 
management and distribution of a trust estate, submission of accounts 
and reports to beneficiaries, payment of trustee's fees and other 
obligations of a trust, acceptance and change of trusteeship, and other 
aspects of the administration of a trust shall proceed expeditiously 
consistent with the terms of the trust, free of judicial intervention and 
without order, approval or other action of any court, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court as invoked by interested parties or as 
otherwise exercised as provided by law. 
6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Summary of Argument: 
The provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code govern all matters of 
decedent's estates, whether by will or trust. The settlement of any controversy in 
administration of decedent's estates must be memorialized in writing signed by every 
person whose interest may be affected by the compromise before it is binding..4 
Background: 
Decedent ("Almon") and Appellant ("Marian") were acquainted when young but 
each married another. After his first wife's death, Almon located Marian (then single), 
seeking marriage. Coincident with the marriage, Almon established trust and will 
documents that provided use of all assets for Marian's care.5 The couple was married 
on October 5, 1987, just eleven years before Almon was diagnosed with terminal liver 
cancer. 
Almon's deceased first wife had born five (5) children: Vicki, Joel, Lynette, 
Connie, and Mark. 
Almon J. Flake, died on November 15, 1998, at the age of 75 years, and at the time 
of his death was domiciled in Centerville, Utah. He was survived by his spouse, 
Marian, and by five children of his first marriage. 
4
 Utah Uniform Probate Code, §§ 
5
 Defendant's Exhibit 1. 
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Commencement of Estate Litigation: 
1. In October, 1999, Marian filed a Petition, seeking her appointment as 
Personal Representative of Almon's estate. Four of Almon's five children 
filed an objection to Marian's Petition and a hearing was held. 
2. Marian testified that a few weeks before Almon's death their net estate 
was approximately $800,000.00.6 That sworn estimate was presented by 
Marian and was not contradicted at the Hearing on February 10, 2001. 
Even though Almon died in 1998 there had been no accounting provided 
to Marian. The first information or documentation provided to Marian 
was more than two years later at that first hearing in February 2001. 
3. However, by the date of that first hearing, more than two years after 
Almon's death, the Estate/Trust accountant, Mark Flake (a son), testified 
that the Trust only held $428,000.00 in real property and had only 
$2,000.00 in cash remaining.7 Mark also testified that the Trust had made 
large "personal loans"8 to him and the other three contesting children. 
The oldest child, Vicki, refused to participate in the last minute transfer 
scheme and refused to join in the present litigation. 
4. Coincident with and under their interpretation of the 1998 amendment, the 
contesting children also had their attorney, Mr. Carver, establish 
JALCOM Ltd. into which a new mountain retreat had been transferred just 
6
 Record — 1352, Transcript of Hearing, 2/10/2000, pp. 3-4; p 10, 
7
 Ibid., p. 3, line 25. 
five days before Almon's death. The contesting children and their 
spouses are the only holders of interest in JALCOM.9 The mountain 
cabin is valued variously at $200,000.00+. 
Circumstances of Almon J, Flake's death and testamentary documents: 
5. After Almon was sent home to die, the four youngest of his children (Joel, 
Lynette, Connie, and Mark) took Almon to their attorney, Mr. Carver, attempting to 
establish replacement trust and will documents, transferring everything to themselves, 
leaving Marian with nothing.10 
6. Such documents were completed on November 10, 1998.11 
7. Almon died at his home in Centerville on November 15, 1998. 
8. The second child, Joel Flake, was designated Trustee.13 Acting through 
Joel, the four contesting children took the position that the new 1998 "restatement" of 
the trust and will documents "revoked" the 1987 documents, leaving nothing for 
Marian's care. Marian's health is not good. She has experienced substantial difficulty 
with her health and is hard of hearing. 
9. Still no interested person had ever yet sought judicial assistance in 
administration of the estate. Then, on April 14th of the next year the contesting children, 
accompanied by their attorney, Mr. Carver, claimed to have reached a verbal agreement 
8
 Ibid., p. 4, line 5. 
9
 Transcript, September 29, 2000, page 17, lines 2-7. 
10
 Defendant's Exhibit 15. 
11
 Defendant's Exhibit 15 and Documents drafted establishing JALCOM LLC, transferring a new 
mountain cabin out of the estate just five days before Almon died. 
12
 Death Certificate, Plaintiffs Exhibit 26. 
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under which Marian consented to the contesting children's terms. A document was 
later prepared to that effect by Mr. Carver and presented to Marian.14 That document 
was never signed by anyone. Nevertheless, the trial court held the unsigned draft 
document as evidence of a binding contractual agreement, binding against Marian. 
10. Marian is 76 years old. As the contesting children have interpreted the 
1998 documents in which they participated in preparing and signing, the contesting 
children have only permitted Marian to live in a certain designated and strictly limited 
portion of the marital home until she either moves out or dies.15 
MR. MARTIN: I'm just trying to make it as brief as I can — that 
Marian now [after Almon 's death] was entitled to live in the house, 
the upper portion of the house, as long as she wanted? 
JOEL FLAKE: That was our intent, yes. 
Q. And if she moved from the house, then that would forfeit her 
interest in the house? 
A. That's my understanding what the trust says, yes. 
Q. And that the only other obligation was to give her what was hers at 
the moment of death, or to pay your dad's part of the debts? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And from the moment of your dad's death forward, then the trust 
had no obligation to pay any of Marian's debts? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, it had no obligation to pay any medical expenses? 
13
 Defendant's Exhibit 15. 
14
 Defendant's Exhibit 40. 
15
 Record, Trial Transcript, pages 145-147. 
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A. 1\ 
Q. It had no obligation to make any payments of any kind beyond the 
date of your father's death? 
A. Yeah. My understanding is is that our only obligation was to 
maintain a home and to cover utilities, minus telephone. And also 
in the trust I believe it states that the maintenance was at my 
discretion, other than major items. * * * 
Q. In other words, when you talked with your dad, he says, I want to 
make sure she's got enough money, but you're to make sure she 
doesn't spend too much? 
A. Yeah. His desire was to provide Marian with a place, and he said to 
me that, what I need to do is make sure that Marian has a place to 
live in the rest of her life and know that she can be comfortable in 
there no matter what else happens, and that was my responsibility. 
Q. And to take care of her so she didn't starve in the house? 
A. No. 
Q. No Obligation to do that? 
A. No obligation to do that. 
O So only just to be able to sta> It 1 the I ioii.se? ' I hat w as it? 
A. That's right. 
From the date of her husband's death, Marian was instantly left destitute, 
bankrupt and receiving welfare assistance from her church I ler enajjiistutiees irtfuiral 
that she file bankruptcy while proceedings were still pending before the trial court. 
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12. The contesting children literally left Marian to starve to death. Joel 
testified at trial that neither he, the contesting children or the Estate or Trust had any 
obligation for Marian's care. 
13. At trial, the Court considered the requirements of Goodmansen v. Liberty 
Bending Sys., 866 P.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1993), dealing with the enforcement of oral 
agreements made subsequent to filing litigation. 
14. The Court also expressed concern as to the applicability of a certain 
section of the Utah Probate Code, namely §75-3-912, UCA, that requires that all 
agreements under testamentary or non-testamentary transfers of decedent's estates 
must be set forth in "written contract executed by all who are affected by its 
provisions." 
15. After a brief recess, the Judge took the bench and entered the following 
comments, setting forth Judge Memmott's ruling on the record:17 
Now, normally, as set forth in Goodmanson vs. Liberty Bending at 866 
P. 2d 581, there is a summary of the standard of review of a trial court and 
the ability of a trial court to enforce a settlement agreement and that it's 
not to be reversed except upon the finding of abuse of discretion and it 
goes through a litany of cases and explains that a court should enforce 
settlement agreements in lawsuit and it doesn't make any difference when 
that settlement agreement, whether it takes place out of presence of the 
court or stipulation. It is the duty of the court to enforce settlement 
agreements and it specifically says in that case, it's of no legal 
consequences if the parties have not signed the settlement agreement. 
Likewise, if a written agreement is intended to memorialize an oral contract, 
the subsequent failure to execute the written document does not nullify 
the oral contract. 
17
 Record, Trial Transcript, September 27-29, pages 289-292. 
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But the basis of this and all the cases that were cited that I have read 
by the parties which was the recorded portion of the settlement 
agreement, the settlement meaning occurred after there are specific rules 
and regulations as to whether they need to be in writing and all of those 
that are governed by the court. 
The difficulty with this case is there wasn't a lawsuit filed at the time 
the parties met and specifically in the Uniform Probate Code under section 
75-3-912 there is a specific provision which provides, it allows private 
agreements among successors in resolving prior to any action being filed. 
However, there's a specific provision in the Probate Code that says any 
settlement agreements among successors — it says in order to do that 
they must be provided "in a written contract executed by all who are 
affected by its provisions." 
And so in the Probate Code we have a provision that says, yes, you 
can do this before you file, start the probate action, but specifically in 
order for that agreement to be binding it has to be in writing, executed by 
all the parties. 
Now, if that's the case then clearly this agreement ^ ^ 
executed by all the parties and so wouldn't be binding. 
The difficulty the Court has is that this provision under 75-3-912 deals 
with successors under wills or intestacy. It doesn't reference trusts. 
Now there's probably a reason that it doesn't reference trusts [it] is 
because initially when this probate code was drafted 75-7, that dealt with 
trusts, was not in the original provision or was later added. 
And it may be, this is the Court's assumption in having drafted part or 
been involved in legislative general counsel drafting is that when they 
added the trust provision they didn't go back and amend some of these 
general provisions that applied to these provisions. 
But nonetheless, this provision — it is not logical that if you're going 
to require all that for wills and intestacy, if you have issues of successors 
that the same logic doesn't apply under trust agreements because the 
trusts are now in the probate code. 
But it doesn't provide it so therefore the court is going to find that 
because the legislature didn't specifically add "trusts" when it added 
trusts to the agreement that this provision that required that this be in 
13 
writing would not apply to this reading because this had to do with the 
rights of successors under a trust agreement and not under a will or 
intestacy. 
Now, I gave them the opportunity to brief that. I had a law clerk look at 
this and I don't know, although, but that's the specific ruling of the court. 
So now the court is faced with - while there is a written exception to 
others that doesn't apply. 
This is not a trial settlement agreement so those cases don't apply. 
What is left is the general contract provision that if a written agreement 
is intended to memorialize an oral contract, a subsequent failure to execute 
the written agreement does not nullify the oral contract. 
So on just basic contract law was this meeting of the fourteenth of 
April 1999, did it constitute the basic terms in order to create an oral 
contract. 
In that regard the Court, and that's the standard that the Court is going 
to use in this first part of the trial. On that basis the court is going to make 
the following specific factual findings. 
[Judge Memmott then stated his findings commensurate with the 
above analysis, entering his ruling that the alleged oral agreement was 
binding against Marian's objection.] 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
The "Uniform Probate Code" Official Text and Comments Approved by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1969 states that the Code was 
designed to bring together uniform rules to govern all testamentary and non-
testamentary transfers related to death, including any matters or documents that appear 
to have testamentary effect. 
The Official Text of the Uniform Probate Code was approved by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the American Bar 
14 
Association i n i August, 1969.18 - • • :.- . •. was 
directed to be effective July 1, 1977. 
The long title of the Model Code establishes the broad intent to bring all matters 
together: 
Relating to affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, 
minors, incapacitated persons and certain others and constituting the 
Uniform Probate Code; consolidating and revising aspects of the law 
relating to wills and intestacy and the administration and distribution of 
estates of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, 
incapacitated persons and certain others; ordering the powers and 
procedures of the Court concerned with the affairs of decedents and 
certain others; providing for the validity and effect of certain non-
testamentary transfers, contracts and deposits which relate to death and 
appear to have testamentary effect; providing certain procedures > 
facilitate enforcement of testamentary and other trusts; making uniform 
the law with respect to decedents and certain others; and repealing 
inconsistent legislation. 
The Editorial Board Comment on the first page states that, 
The concept of the Code is that the "affairs of decedents, missing 
persons, disabled persons, minors, and certain others" is a single subject 
of the law notwithstanding its many facets. 
The hiilotial Hoard I oniniciil set fori I I lis w pietaa In 1 'hapten 7 dealing with 
"Trust Administration" contains explanations and the following wording related to 
trusts, 
Editorial Board Comment. — Several considerations explain the presence 
in the Uniform Probate Code of procedures applicable to inter vivos and 
testamentary trusts. The most important is that the court assumed by the 
Code is a full power court, which appropriately may receive jurisdiction 
over trustees. Another is that personal representatives under Chapters 3 
and 4 and conservators under Chapter 5, have the status of trustees. Tt 
See: Uniform Probate Code, with comments, West Publishing Co., JL 83 
15 
follows naturally that these fiduciary and regular trustees should bear a 
similar relationship to the court. * * * 
One of the problems with inter vivos and receptacle trusts at the 
present time, however, is that persons interested in these arrangements as 
trustees or beneficiaries frequently discover that there are no simple and 
efficient statutory or judicial remedies available to them to meet the special 
needs of the trust relationship. * * * 
Modestly endowed persons who are turning to inter vivos trusts to 
avoid probate are of more immediate concern. Lawyers in all parts of the 
country are aware of the trend toward reliance on revocable trusts as total 
substitutes for wills which recent controversies about probate procedures 
have stimulated. * * * 
Several objectives of the Code are suggested by the preceding 
discussion. They may be summarized as follows: 
1. To eliminate procedural distinctions between testamentary and 
inter vivos trusts. * * * 
Part 2 of Chapter 7 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, Jurisdiction of Court 
Concerning Trusts, states that: 
75-7-201. Court — Exclusive jurisdiction of trusts. 
1. The Court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by 
interested parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts. Proceedings 
which may be maintained under this section are those concerning the 
administration and distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights, and 
the determination of other matters involving trustees and beneficiaries 
of trusts. These include, but are not limited to, proceedings to: 
a. Appoint or remove a trustee. 
b. Review trustees' fees and review and settle interim or final 
accounts. 
c. Ascertain beneficiaries, determine any question arising in the 
administration or distribution of any trust, including questions of 
construction of trust instruments, instruct trustees and determine 
the existence or nonexistence of any immunity, power, privilege, 
duty, or right. 
* * * 
2. A proceeding under this section does not result in continuing 
supervision by the court over the administration of the trust. The 
management and distribution of a trust estate, submission of accounts 
16 
and reports to beneficiaries, payment of trustee's fees and other 
obligations of a trust, acceptance and change of trusteeship, and other 
aspects of the administration of a trust shall proceed expeditiously 
consistent with the terms of the trust, free of judicial intervention and 
without order, approval or other action of any court, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court as invoked by interested parties or as 
otherwise exercised as provided by law. 
Section 'i I .'III nl ilk' III,ill Uniform ProbaU <'odi establishes definitions of 
phrases: 
75-1-201. General definitions. 
16. "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, 
creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or 
claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent * * * 
One secondary treatise on the subject of the Utah Uniform Probate Code made 
the following comment.19 
The [Uniform Probate Code] system is based upon the premise that the 
State, through the Courts, should provide remedies which are suitable and 
efficient to protect any and all rights regarding succession, but should 
refrain from intruding into family affairs unless relief is requested, and [the 
court] limits its relief to that sought. 
The Editorial Board Comment officially appended to section 7>-l-2()/», stdk-N in 
In considering this section as it relates to a devise to a trustee for 
various beneficiaries, it is to be noted that "interested persons" is defined 
by § 75-1-201(20) [24] to include fiduciaries. Also, §§ 75-l-403(l)(b) [75-1-
403(2)] and 75-3-912 show a purpose to make trustees serve as 
representatives of all beneficiaries. [Emphasis added.] 
Finally, any trustee or personal representative who pursues litigation for his own 
purposes or benefit is not entitled to compensation for his efforts. Such person is not 
17 
entitled to bill expenses incurred by litigation designed to improve his own financial 
gain. 
Section 75-3-719, "Expenses in estate litigation" does provide that a person who 
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith is entitled to receive his necessary 
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred. However, the Editorial Board 
Comment officially appended to that section states that, as an example, 
Litigation prosecuted by a personal representative [Trustee] for the 
primary purpose of enhancing his prospects for compensation would not 
be in good faith. 
POINT 2 
The trust, will and other testamentary documents before the Court establish and grant 
Marian Flake certain rights under law. Such rights may only be relinquished by express 
waiver. 
Having heard evidence and reviewed both the law and documents on file, the 
Court has determined that both the 1987 and the 1998 trust documents grant Marian 
certain rights under law. The Court has determined from the facts and evidence heard 
that the 1998 documents must be interpreted as a restatement in full of both documents, 
each providing for different aspects of Marian's care. 
Trusts, wills, and other testamentary like documents establish certain rights. In 
this regard, a trust constitutes much more than a contract between two parties. Laws 
governing decedent's estates establish certain beneficial rights that the law must 
protect. 
Martin, Utah Probate Handbook, 1982, page 77. 
18 
Respondents request lliat Itn: (\mt\ oiik UIIISHIH flu; inM it^  A uMithul that 
mm he tnodifk >l m u \ crs superficial way—argument over oral modification agreement. 
To the contrary, the Respondents are in actuality asking the Court to deprive Marian of 
rights that had been established under law upon Almon's death. Simple agreemeiit or 
oral i orilrad, ospcualh LTUMIII lite nmimstances of Marian's healr :•• hearing, does 
not constitute a knowing waiver of substantive rights. 
A waiver must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right. It must be 
distinctly made. InXerwest Const! I Valmet. KK6 l'2<i *r ffi \(T, |W4i Hthb v. 
R.O.A. i Inc., 773 P.2d 834 (Ct. A pp. 1989). To constitute a waiver, one's actions or 
conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an intent to 
waive, and must be inconsistent with any other intent. Hunter v. Hunter, hM V 3d AM) 
(Utah 1983), Arnei km i Sa \ '/; ig s & I c n v i Ass fs v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1968) 
The facts in the present case do not establish a waiver. On the other hand, the 
facts do establish an argument even in estoppel. The Contesting Children have no 
actions upon vv hicl I tit ie> can rest to show coi npassi : >n for the si lr > • h • ing w idow of their 
father. On the contrary, when the trustee was asked if he had any duty to Marian if she 
was in the home and yet literally starving to her death, the trustee said, "No!" Waiver 
"is the voluntary, intentional relinquishment o! a kn.iwn ir.'hl. Kfoppd \m fin; Dther 
hand, is a doctrine that precludes parties from asserting their rights where their actions 
or conduct render it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights. The evidence has 
established that the Contesting Children not only did not recognize Marian's rights, but 
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they took every advantage to themselves, causing as much damage to Marian as they 
thought they were able. 
One holding a fiduciary duty to another may not act in his own self-serving 
interest, using every action to protect his own pocket. Fundamental moral and legal 
duty requires otherwise. 
A knowing and intentional waiver of rights is required under the Uniform Probate 
Code. A settlement or compromise of any controversy that effects the rights or 
interests in the estate of any decedent or successor must be in writing. Further, Part 11, 
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, "Compromise of Controversies—Procedures for 
Securing Court Approval" §§ 75-3-1101, 1102(1), requires that any such agreement shall 
be set forth in an agreement in writing and executed by all persons having any 
beneficial interest or claim affected by the agreement/compromise. 
Thus, the trial court is not permitted to even approve any compromise set forth in 
writing and signed by every person. To hold otherwise is reversible error. 
75-3-1102. Procedure for securing court approval of compromise. 
The procedure for securing court approval of a compromise is as follows: 
(1) The terms of the compromise shall be set forth in an agreement in 
writing which shall be executed by all competent persons and parents 
acting for any minor child having beneficial interests or having claims 
which will or may be affected by the compromise * * * . 
(2) Any interested person, including the personal representative or a 
trustee, then may submit the agreement to the court for its approval * * 
* 
The Record leaves no doubt that Marian ever intended or thought that an 
agreement had been reached at the April 14th meeting. She awaited receipt of the draft 
of an agreement. She never believed that an agreement was made under which she 
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would remain destitute. She will never believe thai her deceased husband whom she 
had known smu1 eluldhood intended In leave her destitute. She will always believe that 
the contesting children, literally taking Almon from his death bed and directing the 
drafting of the new documents, were only able to persuade Almon to sign documents 
because they .mull lliun Jillonin (nidi linn lli.il In hail las problems mull needed 
additional documents to assure Marian's care. Marian believes that Almon could not 
understand that what four of this children arid theii attorney had written would be 
carefully drafted and interpreted to leave her destitute Almon 1 lake was |Ust not that 
I • 
CONCLUSION 
Enforcement of an unexecuted agreement against Marian is reversible error. 
\\heii (in! Make or am olhei pa mil .uirpl the* lille and position oi Trustee, 
they thereby accept the personal fiduciary obligation to all beneficiaries. That means 
that any Trustee of the Almon J. Flake Trust carries the highest duty and obligation to 
protect not themselves bi it beneficiaries. Undei am interpretation, Marian Hake is a 
beneficiary. 
When the matter is brought before the Court, the obligation is to properly 
instruct the Trustee in his or her duties. There is sworn U-*tmion\ ot flu lour named 
contesting children lhai Ihev have each directly benefited from the actions that have 
been taken against Marian. They have taken money (cash) to themselves from the trust 
estate without regard for Marian. They have tried in every manner to delay, deny, and 
eliminate Marian's interest. Violation of a fiduciary duty m. ' ' . w^t not be 
21 
maintained or in any manner encouraged. Trying to intimidate Marian into some 
agreement in violation of the law's requirements for a written contract executed by all 
interested persons is unquestionably not acting under a duty to protect Marian as a 
beneficiary. As prayed in Marian's Petition, violation of a fiduciary duty is grounds for 
removal and disqualification of all persons who aided or encouraged the depredation of 
Marian's rights, leaving her both church and government welfare qualified. 
In the present circumstances and case, the trial court set out an agenda and order 
for trial. In good faith, the trial Court tried to keep with that agenda. However, holding 
that Marian had lost or waived a fundamental right through a constructively imposed 
oral agreement was error. Any testimony from that moment forward would have been 
likewise in fundamental error. Recognizing that possibility, the Court issued an order 
that at least temporarily suspended the proceedings. 
Finally, there is no evidence of consideration given nor were any actions taken 
by Respondents in detrimental reliance upon the purported agreement of April 14. It is 
fundamental that any binding contract requires consideration—no consideration—no 
contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Marian prays that the Court, reverse the judgment and order of the trial court, 
directing the trial court to remove Joel Flake as Trustee, set aside the 1998 trust and will 
documents, prohibit any of the contesting children from holding the office of Trustee, 
and appoint a corporate fiduciary as Trustee during the remaining term of Marian's life. 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is required. 
DATED: this 4th day of December 1999. 
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